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 I. Introduction 
 It should come as no surprise that the 112th Congress, which met from January 
2011 until the beginning of January 2013, was one of the least productive in American 
history. In a time of bitter political polarization, getting even the simplest bills to pass in 
the House or Senate quickly escalates into a battle  Our lawmakers attempt to shape 
policy based on their differences rather than their commonalities as Americans. Their 
actions are guided by the interests of their party, not their constituents’ interest. Partisan 
polarization in Congress leads to gridlock, which decreases the overall productivity and 
effectiveness of the legislative branch. In my quest to show how polarization shapes the 
outcomes of congressional activity as well as public opinion, I will take several steps. 
 Part one will review previous works on the topic. I will explore the Framers’ views 
on partisanship, the relationship between congressional and public polarization and the 
effects of such polarization, and lastly, the roots of polarization. In part two of this paper, 
I will discuss case studies of polarization in Congress. I will discuss the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, welfare reform in 1996, and the failure of comprehensive immigration reform in 
2007; each of these bills illustrates the effects of partisanship on congressional 
outcomes. I will discuss the effect of polarization on Congressional productivity by 
exploring processes used to pass or bury major pieces of legislation in each of the 
aforementioned decades. In part three, I will conduct research on the partisanship of the 
public and its relationship to public opinion using American National Election Studies 
Data on civil rights, welfare spending, and immigration. I will analyze the links between 




II. Literature Review 
 
The Framers and Political Parties 
 It can be argued that our political system was born out of polarization, or to state 
this more mildly, differences of opinion. Sarah Binder urges us to look at the institutional 
context of gridlock and polarization, reminding us that Alexander Hamilton warned in the 
Federalist Papers that the institutional arrangements  and internal procedures of the 
Continental Congress were the perfect recipe for deadlock, and in turn, frustrated 
members of the Congress (Binder, 2006, p. 302). Her point is that the occurrence of 
gridlock is not a new invention in American politics. 
 What did the Framers have to say about political parties? In Federalist No. 10, 
James Madison, under the guise of the pen name “Publius,” discusses factions in 
government. He acknowledges that differences of opinion are natural by writing, “...the 
latent causes of faction are thus sown into the nature of man” (Madison, 1787).  He 
refers to factions as a disease to the Republican form of government. The goal of the 
Federalist Papers was to convince states to ratify the new Constitution, so Madison 
asserts his belief that a large Republic (as established by the Constitution) would guard 
against factions and control against their damages (Madison, 1787). This is perhaps the 
most convincing evidence that our political system as envisioned by the Framers was 
not built for the bitter two-party division visible today. 
 George Washington warns against the dangers of sectionalism in his farewell 
address of 1796, and expounds upon the importance of unity as Americans. He 
declares, “The name American, which belongs to you in your national capacity, must 
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always exact the just pride of patriotism more than any appellation derived from local 
discriminations” (Washington, 1796). Although political parties as we know them were 
not fully in existence at the time of this address, we can apply this to contemporary 
times and assume that Washington would want Americans to place their national 
patriotism above their political party identity; in other words, work for the benefit of the 
country, not the party. Washington talks a great deal about the strength found in unity. 
He, like Madison, acknowledges that factions are natural by saying that they find their 
“root in the strongest passions of the human mind” (Washington, 1796). Both Madison 
and Washington acknowledge the existence of factions and warn of their danger.  
 
Public Polarization and its Effects 
 On the topic of public polarization, there are two major points of view. To be 
clear, the term “public” in this discussion is used in reference to American citizens 
outside of the political sphere. The first is the view that the public is growing increasingly 
polarized. Alan Abramowitz very much believes this. In his book, The Disappearing 
Center, Abramowitz begins by examining what he has deemed “the Bush Effect.” He 
argues that in the 2004 presidential election, the public’s evaluations of George W. 
Bush set a new standard in an era of increasing partisan polarization (Abramowitz, 
2010, p. 27). He points to a 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) survey, in 
which 90 percent of Republicans approved of Bush’s performance, while 81 percent of 
Democrats disapproved (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 27). Abramowitz conducts a series of 
regression analyses of Bush ANES feeling thermometer rankings in 2000 and 20041. 
                                                 
1 The feeling thermometer is a scale on which 0 degrees represents the lowest possible rating of an 
individual or group and 100 degrees represents the highest (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 27). 
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The independent variables included party identification, as well as such things as 
gender, race, income, education level, and frequency of church attendance. He found 
that the overall explanatory power of the regression analysis increased dramatically. In 
2000, the regression analysis explained only 37.5 percent of the variance in Bush 
evaluations; in 2004, it explained 53.7 of the variance (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 29). 
Abramowitz uses the Bush Effect as one of the main tenants of his argument for the 
increasing polarization of the American public. 
 Other indicators of polarization Abramowitz uses are party identification and voter 
registration statistics to show that the proportion of pure independents in the electorate 
has been declining since the 1970s, while the level of partisan voting has been 
increasing (Abramowitz, 2010, p.55). He explains recent high levels of partisan voting 
by showing that the degree of consistency between party identification and ideology is 
increasing. He cites a Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) that surveyed 
voters in the 2006 election. The survey found that 94 percent of Democratic identifiers 
and leaners were found on the left side of the liberal-conservative scale, while 88 
percent of Republican leaners and identifiers were found on the right side of the scale.  
 In another book on the same topic, entitled Polarized Public? Why American 
Government is So Dysfunctional, Abramowitz once again tackles the issue of public 
polarization. He argues that there has been a steady increase in the ideological 
distance between supporters of the two major parties. He cites an ANES study that 
tracks trends in the average location of Republican and Democratic voters on a seven 
point liberal-conservative scale between the 1970s and 2010 (Abramowitz, 2012, p.42-
43). The study shows that the gap between the average Republican voter and the 
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average Democratic voter more than doubled, going from 1.0 units in 1972 to 2.2 units 
in 2008 (Abramowitz, 2012, p. 43).  He reworks this data to present it in a more intuitive 
manner. He finds that among Republican voters between 1972 and 2008, the 
percentage of conservatives increased from 55 to 78 percent while the percentage of 
moderates decreased from 32 to 17 percent (Abramowitz, 2012, p. 43). Among 
Democratic voters within the same time period, the percentage of liberals increased 
from 38 to 55 percent while the percentage of moderates decreased from 38 to 32 
percent. As a result, Abramowitz asserts that moderates have nearly disappeared from 
both major parties, making each party more ideologically extreme (Abramowitz, 2012, p. 
43). 
 The opposing view of public polarization is of course that the public is not 
becoming more polarized. Morris Fiorina, author of Culture War? The Myth of a 
Polarized America, holds this view. Fiorina describes the electorate as “closely divided” 
but not “deeply divided” (Fiorina, 2005, p.13). Interestingly enough, he blames 
politicians, asserting that voters are not more partisan but politicians are (Fiorina, 2005, 
p. 114). He makes the point that no matter how moderate the views of the voter, they 
can only choose from the names on the ballot, which increasingly reflect two 
ideologically extreme points of view. Fiorina reviews the findings of a 1996 analysis of 
statistical opinion trends put together by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson, which was 
published in the Social Science Quarterly (Fiorina, 2005, p. 34). The analysis shows 
that between 1975 and 2000 older and younger Americans became more alike in their 
views, not more dissimilar (Fiorina, 2005, p. 35). According to the analysis, the same 
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appears to be true for black and white Americans, more educated and less educated 
Americans, and Americans living in various regions of the country (Fiorina, 2005, p. 35).  
 Fiorina provides detailed research from an ANES study on how people in red and 
blue states are divided based on specific issues. In reference to results of the study, he 
reports,  
 “A solid majority of blue states support stricter gun control laws, but so does a 
 narrow majority of red state voters. Support for women’s equality is 
overwhelming  and identical among voters in both categories of states. ...Similar 
proportions in  both red and blue states believe that the moral climate of the 
country has  deteriorated since 1992, and identical proportions believe that others’ 
moral  views should be respected” (Fiorina, 2005, p. 25).  
 
 This study seems to suggest that ideological differences in red and blue states 
may not be as prominent as expected.  
 Fiorina graphs partisan views on abortion between 1972 and 2000 using General 
Social Survey (GSS) data to find that at the time of the Roe decision (1973) and a little 
after, Republicans were slightly more pro-choice than Democrats; since 1988 the 
Democrats have been more pro-choice than Republicans, but the difference has never 
been more than three-quarters of a unit on a six point scale (Fiorina, 2005, p. 61). He 
asserts that differences in attitudes on abortion have been grossly exaggerated by 
political and media commentary (Fiorina, 2005, p. 63). Fiorina conducts similar 
research, with similar results, on attitudes toward homosexuality. He also examines 
demographic differences like economic cleavages, religious cleavages, and gender and 
finds no evidence of polarization. In the final chapter, Fiorina concludes that Americans 
today are not more polarized, they are just better sorted into parties based on their 
ideological orientations than they were 30 to 40 years ago (Fiorina, 2005, p. 61-70). 
This realignment, in technical terms, means that sorting involves an increase in the 
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distance between the mean locations of the two major parties on the ideological scale 
while polarization is marked by an increase in the standard deviation of the scale as a 
whole. The Republican party has become more conservative, while the Democratic 
party has become more liberal.  
 Alan Abramowitz directly challenges Fiorina’s sorting theory in Polarized Public? 
Why American Government is So Dysfunctional. He acknowledges that Americans are 
better sorted into political parties based on their distinctive ideological orientations. 
However, he shows evidence from ANES research that the correlation between party 
identification and ideological identification has increased from a modest .32 in 1972 to a 
strong .61 in 2008 (Abramowitz, 2012, p. 46). He argues that the increase in sorting and 
the increase in polarization go hand in hand; both have increased between 1972 and 
2008 (Abramowitz, 2012 p. 49). 
 A positive effect of polarization, according to Abramowitz, is increased public 
engagement in the political process. In the Disappearing Center, he argues that the 
polarization of government increased the “ideological sophistication of the public” 
(Abramowitz, 2010, p. 16). He cites evidence from ANES surveys from 1960s to the first 
decade of the 21st century to bolster his argument that public engagement is 
increasing. Comparing the percentage of engaged voters from each decade by looking 
at the percentage of those surveyed who were “very or somewhat interested in 
elections,” “care which party wins the presidency,” and were “politically active beyond 
voting,” Abramowitz found that Americans between 2000-2004 scored higher than their 
counterparts in each past decade (Abramowitz, 2010, p.19).  
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 Next, he argues that increasing polarization of the public has led to an increase 
in voter turnout among partisans in recent years (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 86-87). Once 
again citing ANES data, Abramowitz reports that the turnout rate among partisans has 
increased from about 80 percent in the 1950s to almost 90 percent in 2004 (p. 87). He 
contends that the more partisan the voter, the larger the stake they would have in the 
outcome of the election, so they would be certain to vote (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 87).  
Abramowitz also references Gallup polls from the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential 
campaigns to further support his point (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 112).  
 He writes, “In a Gallup Poll conducted between January 29, and February 2nd, 
 2008, for example, 71 percent of respondents stated that they were giving ‘quite 
 a lot’ of thought to the presidential election. Four years earlier, in early February 
 2004, only 58 percent of respondents said the same thing; and and four years 
 before that, in January 2000, the number was only 38 percent” (Ambramowitz, 
 2010, p.112-13).  
 
Finally, upon examining levels of public participation in primaries in 2008 and 2000, he 
finds that around 57 million Republican and Democratic voters participated in primary 
elections in 2008, compared with around 33 million in 2000 (Ambramowitz, 2010, p. 
113). 
 
Polarization in Congress and its Effects 
 In their book Congress and its Members, Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek 
make a strong argument that members of Congress are becoming increasingly 
polarized. They write, “Party affiliation is the strongest single correlate of members’ 
voting decisions, and in recent years it has reached surprisingly high levels” (Davidson 
& Oleszek, 2006, p. 283). They examine the floor votes of the House and Senate in 
regards to articles of impeachment in 1998-1999, finding that 92 percent of members 
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voted on party lines (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, p. 283). Davidson and Oleszek argue 
that there has been a revival of party voting in recent years, citing a graph of party unity 
votes in the House and Senate between 1972 and 2004 published by Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, p. 284). There is a noticeable upward 
trend in party unity voting beginning around 1980. They write, “The decline of 
conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans, especially in the House, underlies 
much of the ideological cohesion within, and chasm between, today’s Capitol Hill 
parties” (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, p. 286).  
 The authors also refer to a mapping of ideological distribution in the House in 
1998 and in 1968 that was constructed by Sean Theriault (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, 
p. 288). These distributions took the form of a bell-curve on points along a left-right 
scale in which liberal ideology appears on the left and conservative on the right. The 
ideological categories were drawn from members’ voting records. Davidson and 
Oleszek analyze these distributions and find that in 1968, Democrats appeared at 
almost every ideological point on the scale; Republicans were more clustered to the 
right but there was still some spillover into liberal territory (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, p. 
288-89).  In 1998, they found a much different distribution that appeared to be almost 
entirely polarized in which only a handful of members fall into moderate territory, at the 
middle of the scale (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, p. 288-89). 
 Alan Abramowitz points to research in his bookThe Disappearing Center that 
reflects much of the same trends found in Congress and its Members in regards to 
congressional polarization. He contends that a dramatic ideological shift has taken 
place  since the 1980s that has left hardly any moderates in Congress (Abramowitz, 
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2010, p. 139). He cites research that compares the ideological composition of the 95th 
Congress to that of the 108th. The study measured members’ ideologies based on their 
scores on the first dimension of the DW-Nominate Scale created by Keith Poole and 
Howard Rosenthal (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 141)2. In Abramowitz’s analysis of the study, 
he writes, 
  “ Between the 95th and 108th Congress, the moderate bloc shrank from 30 
 percent of the membership to only 8 percent. Meanwhile, strong conservatives 
 grew from only 6 percent of the membership in the 95th Congress to 33 percent 
 in the 108th Congress- by far the largest ideological bloc. Strong liberals and 
 conservatives combined grew from 27 percent of House members in the 95th 
 Congress to 57 percent of House members in the 108th Congress,” (Abramowitz, 
 2010, p. 141).   
 
 In further analysis of the aforementioned research, Abramowitz provides more 
evidence that supports his view of increasing polarization in Congress. Strong liberals 
went from around a third of House Democrats in the 95th Congress to over half in the 
108th. Strong conservatives grew from a sixth of House Republicans in the 95th 
Congress to roughly two-thirds of the 108th (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 142). According to 
his research, it is growing increasingly difficult to find members of Congress who identify 
themselves as either a “moderate liberal” or a “moderate conservative.” 
 The next natural area to explore is the way in which polarization affects the 
political landscape in the United States government, if at all. John Gilmour discusses 
the effect polarization has on the procedural workings of Congress. Sarah Binder finds 
that consequences of hyper-partisanship in Congress include increased congressional 
retirements, as well as lower congressional approval ratings. Finally, Mann and Ornstein 
                                                 
2 Using the DW-Nominate Scale, members of Congress were scored ranging from -.1999 to 4.001. Their 
placement on the scale represents their ideological position (Abramowitz, 2010, p.183).  
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discuss the consequences of polarization in respect to obstruction on behalf of 
members of Congress. 
 In his book, Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics, John 
Gilmour writes, “The underlying cause of deadlock is a fragmented political structure in 
which factions are able to block legislation and which consequently requires broad 
agreement for legislation to pass,” (Gilmour, 1995, p. 5). Factions, as applicable to our 
discussion, would be the Republican and Democratic parties.  He makes it clear that he 
believes strategies of disagreement may be optimal for the politicians who employ them, 
but not for their constituents (Gilmour, 1995, p. 166). It seems as though Gilmour 
believes deadlock as a by-product of partisanship is detrimental to American citizens. 
 Gilmour discusses reasons why politicians refuse to compromise. He points to 
Gingrich’s strategy in the House of Representatives as an example of a reason to avoid 
compromise, writing, “Cooperating with Democrats on the enactment of legislation may 
have produced slightly better bills in the short term, but hindered efforts to win the big 
prize- Republican majorities in Congress” (Gilmour, 1995, p. 24).  In other words, the 
main goal of politicians is to stay in office, and if politicians make concessions to the 
other party, their polarized constituents may view the compromise as unfavorable and 
vote them out. Gilmour also believes that politicians avoid compromise because it is 
beneficial to maintain distance between the two parties. He explains, “When politicians 
enter into compromise agreements with competitors, they allow legislation to pass, but 
they also sacrifice the opportunity to criticize their opponents” (Gilmour, 1995, p. 37). By 
the same token, Gilmour attests that compromise can diminish future electoral 
prospects because it reduces or eliminates issue advantages (Gilmour, 1995, p. 39).  In 
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a discussion of polarization, Gilmour’s inclusion of the following quote from 1964 
Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater seems particularly relevant: “I would 
remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you 
also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” (Gilmour, 1995, p.119). 
 Gilmour next outlines strategies employed in gridlock to avoid compromise. One 
strategy he discusses is what he has deemed “pursuit and avoidance,” which involves 
efforts by the disadvantaged party to avoid political harm by changing its position on a 
issue in order to become closer to the advantaged party (Gilmour, 1995, p. 52). Another 
strategy he discusses is strategic encroachment, which defines its overarching goal as 
minimizing the opponent’s political advantages in respect to a specific issue by blurring 
the positions of the respective parties (Gilmour, 1995, p. 96). A third strategy he 
discusses is the deliberate provocation of a presidential veto by Congress in order to 
generate public support for Congress and disapproval for the president (Gilmour, 1995, 
p.120). However, this tactic could only be employed under divided government (a 
situation in which one party controls Congress and another has the White House). 
 Sarah Binder addresses gridlock in a book entitled Congress Reconsidered. She 
begins by admitting that gridlock is not a new part of American legislative behavior, and 
points to only two eras not tainted by it in the 19th century: the New Deal and the Great 
Society (Binder, 2001, p. 293). She defines gridlock as “the share of salient issues on 
the nation’s agenda left in limbo at the close of each Congress” (Binder, 2001, p. 295). 
Binder makes the point that if major policy change is likely when bipartisan coalitions 
are formed, it is expected that gridlock will rise with polarization (Binder, 2001, p. 300). 
She discusses the consequences of Congressional gridlock. Interestingly enough, she 
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finds that a major consequence is the retirement of Congressmen (Binder, 2001, p. 
309). In a study using the level of gridlock as an independent variable to predict the 
number of retirements from Congress between 1947 and 1994, she found that gridlock 
is a significant predictor  in accounting for patterns of Congressional retirements 
(Binder, 2001, p. 309). Another consequence of legislative deadlock according to Binder 
is low public approval ratings of Congress (Binder, 2001, p. 310). She found that 
between 1974 and 1994, public approval ratings were directly related to legislative 
productivity (Binder, 2001, p. 310). Binder’s correlation, if valid,  would certainly explain 
the low public approval rating of the 112th Congress.  
 In their book, It’s Even Worse Than it Looks: How the American Constitutional 
System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism, Thomas Mann and Norman 
Ornstein discuss the partisan strategy of “hostage taking” in Congress and its 
detrimental effects on governing effectively. Mann and Ornstein believe that what was 
meant to be a routine vote to raise the debt ceiling in 2011 turned into a hostage crisis 
(Mann & Ornstein, 2012). They contend that Republicans in the House and Senate 
were incredibly open about their obstructionist goals in this situation; The “Young Guns” 
in the House of Representatives (Paul Ryan, Majority Leader Eric Cantor, and Kevin 
McCarthy) wanted to use the debt ceiling vote to their political advantage. (Mann & 
Ornstein, 2012, p. 10) 
 As evidence of this, they cite an address Cantor made at a conservative retreat 
in Baltimore, in which he said, “I’m asking you to look at a potential increase in the debt 
limit as a leverage moment when the White House and President Obama will have to 
deal with us. Either we stick together and demonstrate that we’re a team that will fight 
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for and stand by our principles, or we will lose that leverage” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 
11). After roughly a month and a half of negotiations between the White House and a 
congressional committee, the topic shifted from spending cuts to tax increases, at which 
point Cantor abruptly pulled out of talks (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 15). He publicly 
criticized the negotiations, making it clear that the House would never pass any plan 
that included tax increases. Even at the risk of being put on review for a credit 
downgrade, the Young Guns and House Republicans refused to make concessions 
(Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p. 17).   
 In the end, a deal was never reached. House Speaker Jim Boehner sent a letter 
to his House Republican colleagues in which he wrote, “A deal was never reached, and 
was never really close. In the end, we couldn’t connect. Not because of our different 
personalities, but because of different visions for our country” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, 
p.  21). According to Mann and Ornstein, it became increasingly clear that Senate 
Minority Leader, Mitch McConnell, believed party trumped policy in this instance. He 
said, “I think some of our members may have thought the default issue was a hostage 
you might take a chance at shooting. Most of us didn’t think that. What we did learn is 
this- it’s a hostage worth ransoming” (Mann & Ornstein, 2012, p.  25). The authors 
believe that in this statement, McConnell is alluding to the idea that Republicans will use 
the debt ceiling as a bargaining chip in the future. Mann and Ornstein believe such 
“hostage taking” as seen in the 2011 debt ceiling debacle is a clear example of 
ineffective governance on behalf of Congress as a result of hyper-partisanship (Mann & 
Ornstein, 2012, p. 30). 
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Roots of Polarization 
 Views of where the roots of polarization lie differ greatly. Stonecash, Brewer, and 
Mariani provide a less widely accepted view of the roots of polarization. The authors 
contend that liberal voting comes from urban, lower-income, mostly non-white districts, 
while conservative voting comes from higher-income, largely white districts. Democrats 
thus represent liberal districts, while Republicans represent suburban affluent districts 
(Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003, p. 18). They write, “Given their different 
constituencies, Democratic and Republican party members propose different policies 
and find themselves opposing each other. As they continue to oppose each other, the 
sense of difference increases, and party members pressure each other to join together, 
resulting in even greater polarization” (Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003, p.18).  
 Others argue that polarization is on the rise because the institution of Congress 
itself has changed, and in doing so, has made room for partisanship. In his article 
Congress and Constitutional Responsibility, Jeffrey Tulis asserts that Congress in the 
19th century was a much healthier institution than Congress today (Tulis, 2009, p. 520). 
Now, partisanship has become dominant, and party politics take precedence over 
institutional processes and history (Tulis, 2009, p. 520). Tulis considered former West 
Virginia Senator Robert Byrd an anachronism in present day Congress, pointing to the 
way he stood up for the prerogatives of the institution, regardless of which party is 
control (Tulis, 2009, p. 520). Tulis believes that the anachronism of Byrd reflects “the 
loss of congressional constitutional consciousness” (Tulis, 2009, p. 520). Davidson and 
Olsezek, authors of Congress and Its Members, would agree with this assessment. 
They point to social patterns that make friendship across party lines much more rare 
 
16 
now than in the past, saying that this leads to legislatures to turn to party colleagues 
when looking for voting cues (Davidson & Oleszek, 2006, p. 286).  
  Mann and Ornstein share a similar point of view; they too discuss a loss of 
institutional identity in Congress, pointing to a decrease in “institutional patriotism” since 
the 1960s (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p. 146). Mann and Ornstein point to the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 as an example of the 
abandonment of institutional processes for party politics. The bill, which was nearly 
identical to the old version passed eight years prior that had been drafted by the credit 
industry, came to the Senate floor in March 2005; Senate Republicans pledged to shun 
all proposed amendments to the bill in order to bypass a conference committee to pass 
a bill that the House would accept in full (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p. 143). House 
Republicans also pledged that they would not accept any changes to the original draft 
(Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p. 143). Three amendments were proposed, and as promised, 
were categorically rejected (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p. 144-45). Upon reaching the 
House, the bill went through the Judiciary Committee with limited debate, and brought to 
the floor under a rule that prohibited amendments. It then went directly to President 
Bush to be signed into law (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p.145). In summarizing this 
process, the authors write,  
 “ Working off an industry-created draft that was eight years old, and blocking any 
 significant input from anyone directly involved in the bankruptcy process, denying 
 any perfecting or corrective amendments, even when it was clear that they eased 
 flaws or gaps in the bill, and actively seeking to prevent any deliberative process, 
 the leaders of the House and Senate obtained a law- but one that was filled with 
 holes and problems, many easily anticipated, that would bring substantial 
 upheaval and injustice to large numbers of Americans” (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, 
 p. 146).  
 
 Jennifer Henry 
17 
Mann and Ornstein believe this example of the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act illustrates the dysfunction of Congress 
because it shows several examples of complete disregard for institutional norms, like 
debate. The authors believe that situations like this breed polarization. 
 Another idea is that the realignment of the South was the root of polarization. The 
realignment of the South, which took place in the 1960s, marked the time period in 
which southern conservative Democrats shifted into the Republican party, while 
northern liberal Republicans shifted into the Democratic party. The 1964 election, in 
which Barry Goldwater ran against Lyndon B. Johnson, is often cited because of race-
related issues.  Mann and Ornstein cite the realignment of the South because the 
House lost all Southern conservative Democrats, and the Republican Party became 
more cohesively conservative (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p.11). The Democratic party 
became a more “homogenous and left-of-center party” (Mann & Ornstein, 2006, p.11).  
 In The Disappearing Center, Abramowitz mentions the southern strategy of 
Nixon as one of the causes of polarization (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 2). In the 1968 
election, Nixon reached out to southern whites, who had historically been members of 
the Democratic Party, using a “states’ rights” approach, which some argue was a 
euphemism for opposition to enforcement of civil rights for African Americans. 
Abramowitz also cites the Republican takeover of the House in 1994 led by Newt 
Gingrich, as well as the bitter battle over Clinton’s impeachment in 1998 as additional 
sources of polarization (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 2).  
 Another argument that has gained some traction among scholars of polarization 
is that redistricting in states is a cause of increased polarization. Redistricting is the 
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process by which electoral boundaries are drawn. In the majority of states, the state 
legislature has the responsibility of creating a redistricting plan in response to population 
changes. Partisans are then able to redraw boundaries for their political advantage 
using tactics like packing, cracking, and kidnapping. Packing crams more of a party’s 
supporters into a district that is already heavily in favor of the party. Cracking involves 
taking a constituency that normally favors a certain party, and splitting them up among 
several districts to weaken their influence. Kidnapping involves placing two unwanted 
incumbents in the same district so that one will inevitably lose. In their article 
Redistricting and Party Polarization in the  United States House of Representatives, 
Carson, Crespin, Rohde, and Finocchiaro point to evidence that supports the idea that 
districts that have undergone significant changes from redistricting have become even 
more polarized. In their research, the authors created a data set linking congressional 
districts from 1962 to 2002. Each district was placed into one of three categories: 
significant redistricting (new), modest redistricting (continuous), or no change (also 
continuous) (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2007, p. 885). In comparing the 
strength of the two parties in each district with their strength in the nation, the authors 
employed the normalized presidential vote in each congressional district; more 
specifically, they subtracted the Democratic presidential candidate’s share of the vote in 
the entire nation from that in each congressional district for every presidential election 
from 1968 to 2000 (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2007, p. 889). 
  In a graph, the standard deviation of the Democratic presidential vote was 
plotted in each of three categories of districts over time. According to the authors, the 
standard deviation indicates the “spread of district partisanship, with greater spread 
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indicating more polarization” (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2007, p. 890). 
Fiorina also used standard deviation as a measure of polarization. The authors believe 
that this graph suggests that while all congressional districts have grown more polarized 
over time, the districts classified as “new” are always more extreme in the preferences 
of voters (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2007, p. 890). Carson, Crespin, 
Finocchiaro and Rohde contend that the results of their research support their claim that 
most of the redistricting that has occurred in recent years has been partisan in nature; 
the authors do, however, concede that redistricting is just one of many of the causes of 
polarization in Congress (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, & Rohde, 2007, p. 890).  
 In the Disappearing Center, Abramowitz rejects the argument correlating 
increasing polarization with redistricting. He points to evidence that partisanship has 
increased in both the Senate and the House, and state boundaries have remained the 
same (Abramowitz, 2010, p.143). He divides the redistricting hypotheses in two, part 
one stating that partisan redistricting has led to an increase in the number of safe 
districts and a decrease in the number of swing districts within the House (Abramowitz, 
2010, p.143). The second part states that the decreasing competitiveness in the House 
has led to increased polarization (Abramowitz, 2010, p.143). Abramowitz tests these 
two parts by examining changes in the competitiveness of House districts between 1980 
and 2002 and by analyzing district competition and ideological polarization between the 
95th and 108th Congress (Abramowitz, 2010, p.143). The results support his claim that 
neither part of the redistricting hypothesis is true because ideological polarization has 
increased among representatives from both safe and marginal districts (Abramowitz, 





 Upon analysis of my brief review of the vast amount of scholarship on the topic of 
polarization, I can draw a few conclusions. It cannot be denied that the Framers, such 
as James Madison and George Washington, were wary of the effects political parties or 
factions would have on the American political system; both men acknowledged that 
factions are natural, but they also warn of their danger. In respect to public polarization, 
Fiorina and Abramowitz obviously disagree as to whether or not the public is becoming 
increasingly polarized. While both authors present valuable arguments,  it is important 
to note a few issues I have with the authors’ arguments. Fiorina’s book, though 
published in 2005, does not contain any data dated past 2000; this is troublesome 
because it could suggest that recent data does not corroborate his point of view that the 
public is not growing increasing polarized. Abramowitz, on the other hand, is fixated on 
the election of 2004.  It would be helpful if he were to provide more examples that fall 
outside of the scope of this one election year. 
  The way Abramowitz discusses the positive effects of increased public 
polarization on public political engagement is refreshing; it is interesting to view 
polarization in a positive light. It seems as though there is a general consensus that 
Congress is becoming more polarized, and that this is shaping its procedural function. I 
readily accept this claim. After reading the opinions of various scholars on the roots of 
polarization, I feel as though all explanations put forth have worth and have played a 
role in increasing partisanship in American politics.  
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  III. Case Studies of Partisanship in Congress 
 In this section, I will discuss in detail the process of passing or failing three major 
pieces of legislation in each of the following decades: 1960s, 1990s, and 2000-2010. 
First, I will discuss the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This bill eventually became law, but it 
bitterly divided both the House and the Senate in the process, mainly because of the 
opposition it faced from the segregationist Southern Democrats. Next, I will examine the 
process of passing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. 
While it was hailed as a great bipartisan success, details of the debates leading up to its 
passage reveal the lack of civility with which partisans treated one another. Lastly, I will 
analyze the failure of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007. A product of 
bipartisan efforts on behalf of the Bush administration as well as Senate Democrats and 
Republicans, it eventually failed because the far right refused to compromise on certain 
moderate provisions of the bill. I chose these three pieces of legislation because they  
illustrate the impact of partisanship in Congress on the process of legislative politics. 
These case studies provide concrete examples of the effect of partisanship in 
Congress; I will later provide my results in regards to public opinion data and 
partisanship in relation to the topics of civil rights, welfare, and immigration within each 
of their respective decades.  
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was certainly one of the most, if not the most, 
contentious piece of legislation in the 1960s. It exemplifies the extreme procedural 
measures that can be implemented in the House and Senate to pass or defeat 
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legislation in situations of gridlock. The necessity of such a bill was called for by 
President Kennedy in a speech in June of 1963. He spoke of the need for legislation 
“giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the public” as 
well as “greater protection for the right to vote.” The passage of such legislation was 
nearly a year in the making; pro-civil rights legislators faced obstacles in the process 
that seemed nearly insurmountable, such as the longest senatorial filibuster in American 
history (Zietlow, 2006, p.105). Many events led up to the creation of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. First, there was the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, which 
effectively deemed segregated schools unconstitutional and ordered desegregation. 
While the Supreme Court held the power to make this order, it did not have the power to 
enforce it. As it was, many southern states maintained segregation in their schools. 
Efforts by the federal government to forcefully desegregate schools led to violence in 
states like Arkansas and Mississippi. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was passed under the 
Eisenhower administration; it was initially heralded as a historic success until it had no 
real impact on racial discrimination or segregation.   
 The Kennedy Administration constructed the first draft of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964; it reached the floor of the House of Representatives as H.R. 7152 on June 20, 
1963 (Zietlow, 2006, p. 104). Some of the main provisions of the bill included the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in public places, prevention of employment 
discrimination on the basis of race or sex, and prevention of discrimination by recipients 
of federal funds. The bill originated in the House for strategic reasons: the chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee, Emmanuel Cellar, was a supporter of civil rights, while the 
chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James Eastland, was a staunch segregationist 
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(Zietlow, 2006, p.104). Congressional Democrats were divided by region, so bipartisan 
efforts were necessary to pass this bill. In the House, the biggest obstacle to passing 
the bill was Representative Howard Smith, the segregationist Democratic chairman of 
the House Rules Committee (Zietlow, 2006,  p. 104). The original bill did not provide for 
the prevention of employment discrimination based on sex; this amendment was 
actually proposed by Howard Smith as a measure to defeat the bill (Zietlow, 2006, 
p.107). His plan backfired, however, because the amendment was greeted with 
enthusiasm by his colleagues in the House, especially females. In its original form, the 
bill would have covered 20 million African Americans. With the addition of gender, it 
covered around 100 million Americans. It can be said that the introduction of Smith’s 
amendment contributed to the bill’s success in the House. On February 10, 1964, the 
bill passed the House by a vote of 290 to 130.  
 When H.R. 7152 reached the Senate, Senate Leader Mike Mansfield was 
prepared for a certain battle. Before he could offer the motion to consider the House-
passed bill, it had to be put on the Senate calendar, where it could either be motioned 
up or sent to Eastland’s Judiciary Committee, where it would surely die (Stewart, 1997, 
p. 213). In order to circumvent the Judiciary Committee, Mansfield had to use the Rule 
XIV procedure. In enacting Rule XIV, Mansfield noted, “the procedures which the 
leadership will follow are not usual, but neither are they unprecedented. And the 
reasons for unusual procedures are too well known to require elaboration” (Stewart, 
1997, p. 214). He asked for unanimous consent that H.R. 7152 be referred to the 
Judiciary Committee and sent back in its original form no later than March 4, 1964 
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(Stewart, p. 215). Southern Democrats like Eastland, Russell, and Keating objected 
vehemently.   
 Next, Mansfield attempted to introduce the bill during the “Morning Hour,” which 
was the time before 2:00pm during which a motion to take a bill from the calendar would 
be non-debatable. The Southern Democrats were prepared for this, however, and held 
the floor during the morning hour by reading the previous day’s Journal in full, and then 
offering and debating amendments to the Journal (Stewart, 1997,  p. 217-18). 
Eventually Mansfield resolved to offer his motion to consider after 2:00pm. Immediately 
after his remarks, Southern Democrats from states like Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
and North Carolina took the floor, and the filibuster of the motion to consider began 
(Stewart, p. 219).  
 Nearly three weeks later, the Southern Democrats decided that in was in their 
best interest to end the initial filibuster. The Senate voted, 67-15, to proceed with the 
motion to consider on March 26, 1964 (Stewart, 1997, p. 224). The fact that a vote to 
merely consider the bill on the Senate floor took over a month to obtain says a great 
deal about the strength of opposition H.R. 7152  faced in the Senate.  
 Mansfield appointed a pro-civil rights team comprised of Senator Hubert 
Humphrey of Minnesota, Minority Whip Thomas Kuchel of California, and Senator Earl 
Warren, also of California, to guide the bill through the Senate (Zietlow, 2006, p.109). 
Attempting to wear out the Southern Democrats during filibusters of previous civil rights 
bills had failed in 1957, 1960, and 1962. The team strategized and decided they would 
attempt to obtain a cloture vote to end the filibuster (Zietlow, 2006, p. 109). A cloture 
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vote is a procedure used to end debate that requires a two-thirds majority vote. A 
bipartisan effort proved to be crucial in obtaining this cloture vote.  
 Pro-civil rights senators focused their attention on getting Illinois Senator Everett 
Dirksen, a conservative Republican, to support the bill. They believed his support could 
garner enough votes from the moderate and conservative camps to achieve cloture 
(Zietlow, p.109). On April 20, Dirksen offered several amendments to the bill, making it 
clear that if the amendments were adopted, he would support the bill. The amendments 
he offered essentially limited the authority of the Department of Justice in filing suit in 
cases of jurisdiction, and gave the states an initial period of jurisdiction (Zietlow, 2006,  
p.110). A month later, Dirksen made a public appearance in support of the bill. The 
cloture vote was held on June 10, 1964. The southern Democrats’ filibuster ended with 
West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd’s fourteen hour address in opposition of the 
legislation. Dirksen gave final remarks before the vote, saying, “The time has come for 
equality of opportunity in sharing the government, in education, and in employment. It 
must not be stayed or denied” (Zietlow, 2006, p.110). The final tally of the cloture vote 
was 71 to 29. The cloture vote was historic in the sense that it had ended the longest 
filibuster in the history of the Senate, but also because it was the first successful cloture 
vote of a civil rights measure.  
 The vote on the passage of the bill itself was held on June 19, 1964, nearly four 
full months after it first entered the Senate. The vote on the bill was 73 to 27. The bill 
then had to return to the House for another vote because of the Dirksen amendments. It 
passed by a vote of 289 to 126, and President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the bill into 
law on July 2, 1964. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed before the 
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southern realignment (defined in section I), it does not necessarily portray partisan 
division in Congress as we know it today. Instead, the bitter debate in the House and 
Senate over this piece of legislation was one of a regional nature, between Southern 
Democrats, who opposed the bill, seeing themselves as protecting the southern way of 
life, and pro-civil rights Republicans and Democrats, who believed it was time to 
guarantee equal protection of the rights of all citizens. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
exemplifies the extreme procedural measures that can be implemented in the House 
and Senate to pass or defeat legislation in situations of gridlock.  
 
1996 Welfare Reform  
In 1994, Republicans took over both the House and Senate for the first time in 40 years, 
in part because of the success of their Contract with America as a campaigning tool. 
The Contract, the brainchild of the conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation and 
party leaders like Newt Gingrich, detailed the actions Republicans promised to take if 
they became the majority party. It included such topics as crime, fiscal responsibility, job 
creation, and national security. Welfare reform was also one of the cornerstones of the 
Contract with America.  In 1992, Bill Clinton campaigned to “end welfare as we know it,” 
and promised to assemble a task force to tackle the issue (Haskins, 2006, p. 37). Voters 
were hopeful that he truly wanted to pass legislation to reform welfare. Once elected, 
however, Clinton spent the first two years in office focused on passing healthcare 
reform. Clinton did assemble a task force, which grew to 32 members; it represented 
the wide array of views on welfare reform within the Democratic party (Haskins, 2006, p. 
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39). Clinton quickly realized that there was no one proposal for welfare reform that 
would unite Democrats.  
 Republicans saw their Congressional majority and the failure of Clinton’s task 
force as the perfect opportunity to step in and take control of welfare reform. The debate 
on welfare was lodged in two separate philosophies: the Democrats believed that the 
solution lay in getting people trained to work and into jobs, while Republicans believed 
the whole system needed to be overhauled because the welfare system was being 
abused (Drew, 1996, p.140).  In 1996, Republicans constructed two welfare reform bills 
that Clinton vetoed. In his book, Work Over Welfare, Ron Haskins, an economist and 
former congressional advisor on welfare issues, underscores the frustration 
Republicans felt after Clinton’s second veto. He writes:  
  “The night of January 9, with the government closed because of a  blizzard, 
 Clinton announced his veto of the welfare reform bill that Congress had  sent 
 him on December 22. Now welfare, the debt ceiling, two continuing  resolutions 
 and reconciliation- some of the most important legislation produced  by Congress 
 in decades- had been vetoed. Our agenda had been smashed. The 
 Republican revolution was floundering” (Haskins,2006,  p. 266-267). 
 
 Encouraged by Republican governors around the nation, Republicans decided to 
once again attempt to draft a bill that could gain the support of the president. They filed 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 in the House on July 31, 
1996. The goal of H.R. 3507, as stated in the bill, was: 
 “To restore the American family, enhance support and work opportunities for 
 families with children, reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies, reduce welfare 
 dependance by requiring work, meet the health care needs of America’s most 
 vulnerable citizens, control welfare and Medicaid spending, and increase state 
 flexibility” (H.R. 3507, 1996). 
 
Provisions of the bill included such things as instituting the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program, stricter conditions for food stamp eligibility, reductions 
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in immigrant welfare assistance, and work requirements for welfare recipients (H.R. 
3507, 1996). In general, it aimed to make welfare more temporary, as well as give some 
autonomy over its operations to the individual states.  
 As major debates on the bill were expected to begin, Democrats were in an 
uneasy position.  They had not yet been informed of President Clinton’s intentions, they 
were wavering and wanted to take the same course of action as Clinton (Haskins, 2006, 
p. 325). What happened next was the House of Representative’s  clever version of a 
filibuster. Democrat Lloyd Doggett asked for unanimous consent to use a chart on the 
House floor (Haskins, 2006,  p. 325).  Doggett’s chart was blank. Next, Harold Volkmer, 
another Democrat, objected to this request and asked for a recorded vote, which would 
take around a half hour to conduct (Haskins, 2006, p. 326). This same process occurred 
seven times with other Democrats requesting a recorded vote to use their blank charts 
on the House floor (Haskins, 2006, p. 326). These tactics were used to delay a vote, so 
that Democratic representatives could hear what Clinton’s action would be on the bill. 
Along with these absurd stall tactics, there was actual legitimate debate on the bill. The 
debate was bitter and heated. Democrats accused Republicans of proposing to “take 
food from the mouths of children” to pay for their “tax cuts for the rich,” while 
Republicans likened welfare recipients to animals (Drew, 1996, p. 144-45). What was 
meant to be an intellectual debate on the merits and shortfalls of the proposed bill 
turned into an barbaric spectacle.  Hours later, Clinton held a press conference 
announcing his decision to sign the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
of 1996 if it were to pass in Congress.  
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 Upon hearing this, Representative Clay Shaw, the first sponsor of the bill, walked 
to the Democrats’ side of the House and spoke from their microphone, saying: 
 “I hope [Democrats] will give me their understanding in my coming over to their 
 side, because  I do it not out of smugness or arrogance. I do it out of coming 
 together...The degree of success we have now is going to be a victory for the 
 American people, for the poor. It is not going to be a victory for one political party. 
 It is now time for us to put our hands out to one another and to come together to 
 solve the problems of the poor” (Haskins, 2006, p. 330-31). 
 
This was quite the change of pace from the bitter debate that had taken place on the 
House floor just a few hours prior. The bill passed the House by a vote of 328 to 101, 
and the next day passed the Senate by a vote of 78 to 21 (Haskins, 2006, p. 331). 
 While the bill eventually passed the House and Senate by impressive bipartisan 
margins, it is important to remember that votes were still cast along party lines. 
Democrats would have certainly voted against the bill had Clinton announced that he 
would veto it. Welfare reform is yet another example of legislation that faced obstruction 
in Congress because of partisanship. Democrats employed tactics of delay because 
they did not want to stray from the mandate of their president, and in essence, their 
party. Welfare reform of 1996 is contemporarily heralded as a bipartisan success, 
perhaps because the bitterness and infighting was kept from the public eye. 
 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 
 In a speech in the summer of 2006, President George W. Bush called for 
comprehensive immigration reform in an oval office speech, saying: 
 “The issue of immigration stirs intense emotions, and in recent weeks, Americans 
 have seen those emotions on display. On the streets of major cities, crowds have 
 rallied in support of those in our country illegally. At our southern border, others 
 have organized to stop illegal immigrants from coming in. Across the country, 
 Americans are trying to reconcile these contrasting images. And in Washington, 
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 the debate over immigration reform has reached a time of decision” (Bush, 
 2006). 
 
Comprehensive immigration reform could be considered Bush’s one major attempt at 
bipartisan policy-making during his second term. After months of negotiation between 
Republican and Democratic senators, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act was 
brought to the Senate on May 9, 2007, sponsored by Democratic Senator Harry Reid of 
Nevada (S. 1348, 2007). Its provisions were aimed at reconciling the differences 
between liberal and conservative views on immigration. It provided for a new class of 
visa, the “Z visa,” which gave illegal immigrants the legal right to remain in the United 
States, and made them eligible for a green card after eight years (S. 1348, 2007). It also 
made family reunification requirements stricter: only the spouse and children of a new 
citizen would be eligible for green cards rather than all relatives (S. 1348, 2007). It also 
ended the employer-sponsored component of immigration and replaced it with a point-
based merit system based on such qualifications as education, job skills, family 
connections, and English proficiency (S. 1348, 2007). The bill laid out provisions for a 
guest worker program (the “Y” visa) as well as increased enforcement of the US-Mexico 
border (S. 1348, 2007). The bill’s most controversial provision was the DREAM Act, 
which provided a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants who met specific qualifications 
(S. 1348, 2007).  
 The bill was supported wholeheartedly by the Democratic leadership of the 
House and Senate, as well as several prominent Republicans, like Senator John 
McCain (Abramowitz, 2010, p. 166). Opposed to the bill were the extremely 
conservative members of the Republican base. They attacked the “path to citizenship” 
provision, saying it was too close to outright amnesty and rewarded illegal immigrants 
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(Smith, 2007). In a June 2007 speech, McCain defended his supportive stance on the 
bill vehemently, saying: 
 “I defend with no reservation our proposal to offer the people who harvest our 
 crops, tend our gardens, work in our restaurants, care for our children, and clean 
 our homes a change to be legal citizens of this country. They will have to earn it. 
 They must come out from the shadows, pay their penalties, fees and taxes, stay 
 employed, obey our laws, learn our language and history, and go to the back of 
 the line and wait years for the privilege of being an American” (McCain, 2007). 
 
  After the bill was brought up for consideration on the Senate floor, nearly 40 
amendments were proposed by Republicans and Democrats alike. 33 of the 
amendments even reached a floor vote. In order to advance toward a final vote, cloture 
needed to be obtained, which is a 60 person vote in the Senate. A June 2007 cloture 
motion failed with 46-53 vote (Smith, 2007). 33 Democrats, 12 Republicans, and one 
Independent voted to advance the bill to a final vote, while 15 Democrats, 37 
Republicans, and one Independent voted against advancement (Smith, 2007). In 
comments after the failure of the bill, a frustrated President Bush stated, “A lot of us 
worked hard to see if we couldn’t find common ground. It didn’t work” (Smith, 2007). 
The process of the proposal and eventual failure of the Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act of 2007 illustrates perfectly the difficulty in building bipartisan coalitions in 
Congress, especially under intense hyper-partisan conditions. Since the 110th 







Summary of Case Studies 
 I chose the to focus on these three case studies because each of them 
demonstrates the result of partisanship on the legislative process. In the case of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, extreme procedural measures were enacted in the Senate to 
circumvent gridlock. Pro-civil rights senators worked for weeks to obtain the cloture vote 
they needed to end the filibuster of the Southern Democrats and bring the bill forward. 
In the case of welfare reform in 1996, Clinton’s failure to unify the Democratic Party with 
his committee’s proposals on welfare reform allowed Republicans to push their initiative 
through the House and Senate. Afraid of being viewed as obstructionists, Clinton and 
the Democrats reluctantly threw their support behind a the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act although they disagreed with a number of its provisions.  
 The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 failed because a faction of 
extremely conservative Republicans objected vehemently to the “path to citizenship” 
provision of the bill. This faction refused to compromise, believing that no reform was 
better than accepting a bill that did not serve their interests. These three initiatives, 
regardless of their eventual success or failure, were all shaped in a major way by the 
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IV. Findings: Public Opinion and Partisanship 
 The last portion of my paper will discuss the significance of the results of my 
research that explored public opinion in regards to civil rights, welfare, and immigration 
reform in the 1960s, 1990s, and early 2000s, respectively. To conduct my research, I 
used American National Election Study (ANES) survey data found using the Survey 
Documentation and Analysis archive maintained by the Computer-assisted Survey 
Methods Program at the University of California, Berkeley. I generated tables using 
party identification as the dependent variable and responses to survey questions about 
policies as the independent variables.  
 In 1972, a question asking respondents to identify themselves  as liberal or 
conservative on a seven-point scale appeared on the ANES for the first time. Included 
this information, when applicable,  as well as party identification information in order to 
determine if the opinions of Republicans matched up with those of conservatives, and if 
the opinions of Democrats matched up with liberals. To simplify the data, I have 
produced my own tables using my findings from the tables generated from the SDA 
archive. It should be noted that for purposes of efficiency, I manually collapsed the 
liberal/conservative responses from a 7-point scale of ideology to simply liberal, 
conservative, moderate, and in some cases, “other.” Upon analyzing the results of this 
research, it becomes obvious that ideological and political identification have an 







Figure 1.1: Opinion on Government’s Role in Ensuring Fair Treatment of Blacks, by  
 Party Identification- 1964 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
Gov’t should see to it 
that blacks get fair 
treatment in jobs 
44.5% 46.3% 25.4% 
Not the federal 
government’s 
business 
35.5% 33.9% 51.4% 
Other 20% 19.8% 23.2% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative Data File  
 Figure 1.1 is interesting because the ANES data comes from 1964, which was 
the beginning of the southern realignment of political parties (Southern Democrats 
transferred to the Republican Party); yet the results appear exactly as we would expect 
them to after the realignment. Results show that the Democratic Party was much more 
pro-civil rights. 44.5% of self-identified Democrats surveyed believed that it was the 
government’s role to ensure that African-Americans were treated fairly at work, 
compared to only 25.4% of self-identified Republicans.  
 Figure 1.2 shows surprising findings. There are not significant changes in respect 
to the Democratic Party, but Republicans actually appear to have become more 
receptive to civil rights since study conducted eight years prior. 34.5% of Republicans 
surveyed in 1972 believed that the government should ensure that African-Americans 
receive fair treatment in their jobs, compared to 25.4% of Republicans surveyed in 
1964. This could be explained by the general acceptance of civil rights initiatives by 
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American society. In 1972,  more Democrats than Republicans believed that it was the 
government’s role to ensure fair treatments of blacks in the workplace. 
Figure 1.2: Opinion on Government’s Role in Ensuring Fair Treatment of Blacks, by  
 Party Identification- 1972 
 Democrats independents Republicans 
Gov’t should see to it 
that blacks get fair 
treatment in jobs 
46.3% 41.0% 34.5% 
Not the federal 
government’s 
business 
33.3% 32.5% 39.7% 
Other 20.5% 26.6% 25.8% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative File 
 
 
 When the fair treatment of African-Americans question is analyzed from the 
angle of self-identification as a liberal or conservative rather than by party identification, 
we do not find the level of consistency we would expect. Conservative and Republican 
views are more consistent than liberal and Democratic views, but neither match up as 
closely as anticipated. For instance, in Figure 1.3 we see that 69.1% of self-identified 
liberals believe that the government should see to it that African-Americans receive fair 
treatment in their jobs, as opposed to only 46.3% of Democrats.  
 Upon examining 1972 ANES data in regards to public opinion on the 
government’s responsibility involving the fair treatment of African-Americans, it appears 
that the southern realignment had not yet fully taken effect. While a great majority of 
liberals believe that the government should see to it that blacks get fair treatment in the 
workplace, less than half of Democrats shared the same opinion. This could be 
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explained by the “sorting” idea, discussed by Fiorina and Abramowitz in section one of 
this paper. It appears that in 1972, liberals were not yet fully sorted into the political 
party that shared their ideological position: the Democratic party. In the present day, the 
terms “Democrat” and “liberal” are for the most part synonymous. This was not the case 
in 1972. 
 
Figure 1.3: Opinion on Government’s Role in Ensuring Fair Treatment of Blacks, by  
 Liberal/Conservative Identification- 1972 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Gov’t should see to it 
that blacks get fair 
treatment in jobs 
69.1% 36.3% 33% 
Not the federal 
government’s 
business 
20.8% 39.7% 45.5% 
Other 10.1% 24.0% 21.4% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative File 
Figure 1.4: Opinions on Government’s Responsibility to Integrate Schools, by Party  
 Identification- 1964 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
gov’t should ensure 
integration of schools 
43.9% 35.5% 37.9% 
gov’t should stay out 
of this area 
36.2% 43.0% 43.3% 




 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative Data File 




 In figure 1.4, opinions of respondents on the government’s responsibility to 
enforce integration mandates is displayed in respect to party identification. As expected, 
more Democrats (43.9%) than Republicans (37.9%) believe it is the responsibility of the 
government to integrate schools. While this is certainly significant, it is not a staggering 
statistical difference; it could, just as in the case of Figure 1.1, be explained by the fact 
that the survey took place in 1964 before the southern realignment.  
Figure 1.5: Opinions on Government’s Responsibility to Integrate Schools, by Party  
 Identification- 1972  
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
gov’t should ensure 
integration of schools 
39.7% 38.2% 32.4% 
gov’t should stay out 
of this area 
42.9% 40.7% 49.0% 
no opinion 17.4% 21.1% 18.6% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative Data File 
 
 Upon analysis of Figure 1.5, which reflects opinions on integration by party 
identification in 1972, the same trends that were observed in Figure 1.4 appear. It is 
therefore more useful to examine Figure 1.5 in respect to Figure 1.6. Just as in the case 
of attitudes toward the fair treatment of blacks in the workplace, it seems that the 
ideological positions of liberal and conservative were still not yet fully sorted into the 
Democratic and Republican parties, respectively. Only 39.7% of Democrats believed 
that the government should ensure integration of schools, while 64.4% of liberals hold 
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this view. Again, the difference is not as stark between Republicans and conservatives, 
but it is present. 49% of Republicans believed that the government should not concern 
itself with integration, compared to 57.8% of self-identified conservatives.  
 In sum, it can be observed that public opinion on civil rights issues was divided 
by partisanship in both 1964 and 1972, but perhaps not in the same way we define 
partisanship today. Generally speaking, Democrats were slightly more pro-civil rights 
than Republicans. It can be said with a greater level of certainty, however, that liberals 
were much more in favor of civil rights legislation on behalf of the federal government 
than conservatives. This discrepancy appears because the southern realignment was 
still in progress, so liberals and conservatives were not yet fully sorted into the parties 
that share their ideological values. 
 
Figure 1.6: Opinions on Government’s Responsibility to Integrate Schools, by  
  Liberal/Conservative Identification-1972 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
gov’t should ensure 
integration of schools 
64.4% 33.6% 26.5% 
gov’t should stay out 
of this area 
25.8% 51.5% 57.8% 
no opinion 9.8% 15.0% 15.6% 
 
 









Figure 2.1: Opinions on Federal Welfare Spending, by Party Identification-1992 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
spending should be 
increased 
22.2% 18.8% 9.7% 
spending should be 
decreased or cut 
entirely 
32.9% 39.6% 54.1% 
spending should 
remain the same 
43.2% 38.6% 35.0% 
other 1.6% 2.9% 1.3% 
 
 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative Data File 
  
 Figure 2.1, which shows opinions on whether welfare spending should be 
increased, decreased, or should stay the same in correlation with party identification, 
reflects that opinions on this matter are made along party lines. It can be assumed, 
based on general knowledge of party platforms, that Republicans would be more likely 
to favor a decrease in welfare spending, while Democrats would be more likely to favor 
an increase. This holds true in accordance with Figure 2.1: 22.2% of Democrats 
believed that welfare spending should be increased, in comparison with a mere 9.7% of 
Republicans. 32.9% of Democrats believed that welfare spending should be cut, while a 
majority (54.1%) of Republicans held the same view. While more Democrats than 
Republicans believed welfare spending should be increased, still only a small portion of 
Democrats held this view. This could reflect why President Clinton included welfare 




Figure 2.2: Opinions on Federal Welfare Spending by Liberal/Conservative  
 Identification-1992 
 Liberal Moderate Conservative 
spending should be 
increased 
31.0% 15.9% 21.3% 
spending should be 
decreased or cut 
entirely 
26.2% 40.8% 56.4% 
spending should 
remain the same 
41.2% 41.8% 32.0% 
other 2.1% 1.4% 1.3% 
 
 Source: American National Election Study Cumulative Data File 
 
 Upon analysis of Figure 2.2, I have found that the positions of liberals on welfare 
spending in 1992 matched those of Democrats, and the positions of conservatives 
matched those of Republicans. For example, Figure 2.1 shows that 9.7% of 
Republicans believed welfare spending should be increased, compared to 10.3% of 
conservatives as reflected in Figure 2.2. 54.1% of Republicans believed welfare 
spending should be decreased, compared to 56.4% of conservatives. While the 
positions of conservatives are slightly stronger than those of Republicans, this is not 














Figure 2.3: Opinions on Federal Welfare Spending, by Party Identification- 1996 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
spending should be 
increased 
16.6% 12.1% 6.9% 
spending should be 
decreased or cut 
entirely 
43.4% 55.2% 75.4% 
spending should 
remain the same  
40.0% 32.8% 17.7% 
 
Source: American National Election Study 1996  
 
 As discussed in the case study on passage of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996, welfare reform was a hot topic in the 1996 presidential 
election. Figure 2.3 reflects Americans’ frustration with President Clinton’s inaction on 
welfare reform. In 1992, 54.1% of those who identified as Republicans believed welfare 
spending should be decreased or cut entirely, compared to a whopping 75.4% of 
Republicans in 1996. There was even a significant increase in the number of Democrats 
between 1992 and 1996 who believed welfare spending should be decreased: the 










Figure 2.4: Opinions on Federal Welfare Spending, by Liberal/Conservative  
 Identification-1996 
 Liberals Moderates Conservatives 
spending should be 
increased 
20.2% 15.1% 11.3% 
spending should be 
decreased or cut 
entirely 
47.8% 50.1% 56.4% 
spending should 
remain the same 
32.0% 34.5% 32.3% 
 
 Source: American National Election Study 1996 
  
 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are important because they reflect that the American 
citizenry, regardless of ideology, had nearly reached a consensus that welfare spending 
needed to be decreased. In 1996, significantly more liberals and Democrats believed 
that spending on welfare needed to be decreased rather than increased. For the most 
part, opinions on behalf of respective ideologies and parties match up, except for one 
exception. It appears that opinions of self-identified Republicans were stronger than 
those of self-identified conservatives: 75.4% of Republicans believed welfare spending 
should be decreased, compared to 56.4% of conservatives. This could be explained by 
methodology, however. The “conservative” category in Figure 2.4 was condensed from 
respondents identifying as “slightly conservative,” “conservative,” and “extremely 
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conservative.” Respondents self-identifying as Republicans in Figure 2.3 are probably 
from the more ideologically extreme end of the conservative spectrum.  
 Opinions on welfare spending are particularly interesting because while they are 
divided along partisan lines, the division is certainly not as sharp as that found in the 
case of public opinion on civil rights. Perhaps welfare reform was more of a bipartisan 
issue than was reflected by the process of its passage as described in the case study in 
part two of this paper. Upon analysis of figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, it becomes clear 
that welfare reform became generally more important to the American public between 
1992 and 1996, regardless of ideology or party.  
 
Immigration  
 Questions inquiring directly about respondents’ views on immigration (legal or 
illegal) did not appear on the American National Election Study survey until 2004, at 
which time respondents were asked the following question in a post election survey: 
 “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people 
 already here--EXTREMELY likely, VERY likely, SOMEWHAT likely, or NOT AT 
 ALL likely?” 
 
The question does not specify the type of immigration, or from where the immigrants in 
question would be coming. In turn, opinions on the matter do not depend on 














Figure 3.1: Likelihood Increased Immigration Will Take Jobs Away, by Party  
 Identification-  2004 
 Republican Democrat Independent 
extremely likely 17.8% 23.8% 19.4% 
very likely 24.7% 23.9% 26.7% 
somewhat likely 46.0% 40.0% 35.5% 
not at all likely 11.5% 12.3% 18.4% 
 
 
Source: American National Election Study 2004 
 
 Figure 3.1 shows that 17.8% of Republicans and 23.8% of Democrats believed it 
is extremely likely that a spike in immigration will result in a loss of American jobs, while 
24.7% of Republicans and 23.9% of Democrats believed it is very likely that immigration 
will take jobs away. The trend continues in Figure 3.2, which analyzes responses to the 
aforementioned question in respect to ideological identification. 21.7% of liberals and 
23.9% of conservatives believed it is extremely likely that increased immigration will 
take jobs away. 28% of liberals and 31.3% of conservatives believed it is very likely that 
increased immigration will result in job loss for Americans. Because of the standard 
nature of the question, it is simply not useful to examine it in regards to party or 
ideological identification. The results of Figure 3.1 and 3.2 clearly show that opinions on 
the likelihood of increased immigration taking away American jobs do not depend on 
partisan or ideological positions. It is significant, however, that the American National 
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Election Study began asking questions on immigration in 2004; perhaps this means the 
topic had officially landed on the nation’s political agenda by this year. 
 
Figure 3.2: Likelihood that Increased Immigration will Take Jobs Away, by Ideological  
 Identification- 2004 
 Liberal Conservative Moderate 
extremely likely 21.7% 23.9% 29.7% 
very likely 28.0% 31.3% 27.5% 
somewhat likely 40.2% 34.3% 29.0% 
not at all likely 10.0% 10.5% 13.0% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Study 2004 
 
 In 2008, the ANES did not include the same question about immigration that was 
examined in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Respondents were questioned on immigration in a 
new way: “How important is this issue [citizenship of illegal immigrants] to you 
personally?” While the question did include the word “illegal,” which could have negative 
connotations, it again was posed in such a way that respondents’ answers, overall, did 
not correlate with their ideological preferences or party identification. There is an 
exception to this statement, however: 12.7% of Democrats believed the issue was 
extremely important, compared to 19.6% of Republicans. This is significant because it 
reflects the stronger stance Republicans have historically taken on illegal immigration. 
The findings of figure 3.4, which examine opinions on the issue in respect to ideological 
identification are also insignificant. Unlike prior ANES questions on civil rights and 
welfare reform, respondents are only asked their opinions on the importance of the 
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immigration issue. If a question was posed asking respondents’ opinions on solutions to 
the illegal immigration issue, I am fairly confident that responses would have reflected 
partisan positions, just as they did in the cases of  on civil rights and welfare spending. 
Figure 3.3: Opinions on the Importance of the Citizenship of Illegals Issue, by Party  
 Identification- 2008 
 Democrats Republicans Independents 
not important 6.1% 7.5% 10.6% 
slightly important 22.1% 12.5% 23.6% 
moderately important 33.7% 27.0% 24.1% 
very important 25.4% 28.5% 26.1% 
extremely important 12.7% 19.6% 15.6% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Studies 2008 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Public Opinion on the Importance of the Citizenship of Illegals Issue, by  
 Ideological Identification- 2008 
 Liberal Conservative Moderate 
not important 14.3% 10.8% 5.3% 
slightly important 24.5% 21.3% 22.9% 
moderately important 19.9% 30.7% 37.8% 
very important 25.0% 23.2% 23.4% 
extremely important 16.3% 14.1% 10.6% 
 
 
 Source: American National Election Study 2008 
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Summary of Independent Research 
 
 The research I conducted on public opinion in relation to salient issues in various 
decades certainly shows that partisanship and ideology are both strong influence on the 
opinions of respondents in the American National Election Study. In 1964, more 
Democrats than Republicans were pro-civil rights, as expected. Upon analyzing the 
results of the 1972 ANES in respect to civil rights, it can be noted that the Republican 
and Democratic parties were not ideologically extreme: self-identified liberals and 
conservatives held strong views on issues than self-identified Democrats or 
Republicans. In respect to welfare reform, ANES data clearly shows that by 1996, most 
Americans believed that welfare reform was necessary. In both 1992 and 1996, more 
Republicans than Democrats thought welfare spending should be decreased; this aligns 
with partisan beliefs, as expected. Public opinion on immigration when correlated with 
ideological and party identification was not as revealing as in the cases of civil rights 
and welfare. Because of the way immigration questions were posed in 2004 and 2008, 
partisan views on the topic were not expressed. Questions on immigration focused on 
opinions on the importance of the issue, rather than opinions on possible reform 
solutions or the role of government in the arena of immigration. Public opinion regarding 




 In section one of this paper, I discussed previous scholarship on the polarization 
of the American public as well as Congress, and the effects of such polarization. While 
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scholars like Abramowitz and Fiorina disagree on whether or not the public is becoming 
increasingly polarized, it cannot be denied that the Republican and Democratic parties 
have become more ideologically extreme in recent years. It is possible that this is 
because liberals have sorted into the Democratic Party, while Republicans have sorted 
into the Republican Party.  
 Regardless of the reason why this is happening, we know that there are fewer 
moderates in Congress now than ever before. As exemplified in the case studies, 
hyper-partisanship manifests itself in Congress in a number of negative ways: gridlock, 
obstruction, and name-calling on behalf of partisans. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
welfare reform of 1996, and the failure of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 
2007 illustrate each of these manifestations. It is obvious that members of contemporary 
Congress work to serve partisan interests rather than the interests of the nation as a 
whole; they are becoming less and less concerned with compromise or the prospect of 
finding common ground. 
 Partisanship also shapes the opinion of the American public. According to my 
research on American National Election Study survey data, party and ideological 
differences account for a great deal of differences of opinion among Americans. This 
paper aimed to show the effects of polarization on Congress and the public, and discuss 
the linkages between the two. It is important to note that I do not believe polarization is 
a new phenomenon in American politics. It is obvious that polarization accounts for 
much of the behavior of members of Congress, and well as the opinions of the public. 
Only time will reveal the long-term effects of such hyper-partisanship as found in both 
the public and governmental spheres of America today.  
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